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Abstract 
 
Guarantee systems are financial tools designed to mitigate the dysfunctions, 
within credit operations, generated from the entrepreneurs’ demand for 
collaterals. The present work diagnoses the unwanted effects, triggered by 
international rules, on the access to funds by micro, small, and medium 
enterprises; it posits as well the guarantee systems as solutions to these specific 
circumstances. Thus, it examines their legal configurations, their operational 
features, their relation to the financial system, and the performance levels they 
have achieved in Latin America. This paper has deemed virtually all the existing 
systems so that the results are highly significant, providing an outstanding 
contribution of knowledge to this field of study. 
 
This work purposes and introduces an original compilation of guarantee financial 
schemes, unveiling a new reality from the perspective of an empirical 
classification for Latin America. The set has been sorted by the different forms in 
which they have operated and supported the guarantee coverage on its assets or 
whether they have merely acted as operators and managers of an autonomous and 
liquid resource known as guarantee trust or fund –which is predominant within 
public participation schemes that not often bear the collateral coverage on their 
own financial equity. This classification defines and establishes diverse 
operational and administrative situations. 
 
Clasificación, JEL Code: G21, G32, G01 
Keywords: Guarantees, Credit institutions, financial crisis 
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1. Introduction 
Guarantees are mechanisms or instruments traditionally utilized by the financial system to hedge 
the risk of financial operations. Guarantees, in addition to providing security, help mitigate the 
information asymmetry problems between lender and borrower described in scientific literature 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 1983 and 1985). This tool enjoys such acceptance today that the same 
standards of solvency regulation for financial institutions incorporate it in the assessments of 
credit risk, generating an effect of reduction in its capital requirements and provisions (Pombo, 
1993, 1995 and 2006; Freedman, 2004, Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006). 
The financial regulatory intervention on risk control mechanisms is not exempt from 
some sacrifices; one of the most noteworthy renunciations turns to be projects -entrepreneurially 
viable- that could be adversely affected in obtaining funds or cutting financing cost as a result of 
the requirements of international banking regulation. To solve the unwanted effects of 
international norms in the allocation of resources, credit guarantee systems offer and reinforce 
collateral coverage to feasible business projects1 that, in the absence of these securities and terms 
required –due to banking regulation-, are left out of the traditional financial network. Thus, the 
credit allocation procedure is not a pure market mechanism since credit-granting institutions 
must submit their activity to a prudential regulation that requires certain levels of own resources 
and provisions, based on the characteristics exhibited by credit guarantee coverage. Ultimately it 
is needed higher capital requirements and provisions for the coverage of lower quality guarantees 
than for higher quality collaterals. This circumstance represents a credit orientation to borrowers, 
who have such securities, at the expense of those without them -even if the expected cash flows 
for the latter’s projects turn to be stronger than those of the former’s. Concisely, for financial 
institutions, guarantee embodies an unquestionable strategic "value" for their business plans and 
expansion. In fact, they charge lower interest rates to projects with better quality or greater 
guarantee coverage (Bester, 1985 and Llorens, 1996). 
Furthermore, guarantees are a scarce commodity, especially those highly qualified and 
valued, being this fact significantly critical for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) 
to access funding. As a consequence of the paucity of good collateral, access to credit results 
more restrictive (John, Lynch and Puri, 2003). Additionally, the shortage of guarantees produces 
                                                             
1
  They do not seek projects from entrepreneurs willing to pay more to lender, but precisely viable projects to get 
access to competitive conditions or the best rates and terms. 
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imperfections in business financing, making access difficult and worsening conditions for 
interest rate and term for entities (Meyer and Nagarajan, 1996 and Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia, 
2002). 
The lack of collateral, especially the best qualified and weighted, reproduces a selection 
of factors –on the basis of the Basel’ risk mitigation criterion- against others as quality of 
projects, or the effort and ability of entrepreneurs to compete in market. In short, guarantee, 
which is an instrument intended to cover and mitigate moral hazard, becomes a selection 
criterion.  
This situation causes undesirable outcomes: on one hand, the MSME is an important 
generator of employment and wealth; on the other hand, the same rules of the financial system 
discriminate these sorts of businesses against other corporate and even territorial structures 
(Pombo, Molina and Ramirez 2008). 
Guarantee systems arise as an alternative to moderate these adverse effects. However, 
these entities evidence their effects in the long term, so that the support for business sector to 
access funding -utilizing guarantee systems- requires a state policy of permanent status
2
. A 
reflection of the current situation, within a historical perspective, reveals that in recent decades 
guarantee systems have been extended and integrated into the financial systems of many 
Countries: the most developed systems are in North America, Southeast Asia, and Europe, 
utilizing schemes of "guarantee programs administered by a state agency" or schemes of 
corporate guarantee company (mercantile) and/or schemes of mutual guarantee company or 
reciprocal respectively. For the remaining geographical areas, it can be said that their 
developments still remained at the very early stages of advancement (as in Africa and some Latin 
American territories): there is a fresh impulse of the existing mechanisms, especially through 
guarantee programs and new schemes of reciprocal guarantee societies (as in Latin America). 
As a result, guarantee systems are in need of taking into account this heterogeneous 
reality for their own safety, quality, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and relevance. The reverse 
side of this analysis is the transfer of the borrower’s opportunistic behavior, known as moral 
hazard, to the managers of the guarantee entity (Levitsky, 1997; Reig and Ramirez, 1998; 
Camino and Cardone, 1999 and Freedman, 2004), so that the characteristics relative to managing 
                                                             
2
 This is a broader concept than that of public policy in the sense that guarantee system embodies the spirit of 
permanency -as such subsystem of the financial system-. Thus, it should be integrated into the financial system of 
the country concerned. 
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grants and monitoring risks, by the collateral institutions, are crucial for its proper control. In 
some cases, they can cause a possible relaxation in the supervision, monitoring, or control of 
operations performed by financial institutions, with a clear increase in the risk of delinquent and 
failed loans (Manove, Padilla and Pagano, 2001). 
Within this framework, how to configure the study of guarantee systems? What are their 
characteristics? What is their impact? These subjects are not overlooked by academic literature 
although it is an issue that has been recently addressed as a field of research (Pombo and 
Herrero, 2001; Pombo, Molina and Ramirez, 2006, 2007a, 2007b and 2008); this has happened, 
in some cases, through the collaboration of multilateral agencies with specific and isolated 
approaches closely related to consulting projects and, therefore, more focused on technical, 
administrative, and operational matters than on scientists. Hence, the first objective of this work 
is to characterize the diverse existing models of guarantee systems in Latin America that are 
being utilized to address the problem of the lack and/or need of collateral; and the second is to 
propose a classification for these schemes, which is required in order to identify and define a 
potential model for the implementation of future public policies on this subject. 
2. Methodology 
2.1. - The statistics methods 
Our work primarily aims to characterize guarantee systems in Latin America, with the 
intent of formulating, on a second place, a classification based on their features: legal forms, the 
role assumed by the operator and its responsibility, how it is capitalized, and who makes the 
decisions. The response to our first objective is grounded in the descriptive results obtained. 
Subsequently, we address the labor of classification and description of the influencing 
variables for each model; we have tackled the goal of categorization utilizing taxonomy 
techniques (cluster approach), which allow us to set a classification sorted by the institutional 
distinctiveness of the guarantee systems/entities in Latin America. To determine this typology, it 
has been applied a compositional technique –the hierarchical cluster analysis (hierarchical 
cluster)-, which has enabled us to decide the number of groups that actually exist in the 
population under study; during the process, it has been dismissed one of the observations due to 
some missing values observed in one or more of the variables utilized in the study. The number 
of steps taken to form the clusters amounted to twenty. Asymptotically, it has been determined 
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that the maximum distance at which observations should joint to form homogeneous clusters is 
7.5 in units of rescaled distance; in other words, those observations (cases) that bind to a distance 
less than 7.5 are so homogeneous that have to be considered as part of the same group (cluster); 
those which are attached to a rescaled distance exceeding 7.5 are not homogeneous with each 
other and, therefore, belong to different groups. Thus, if we draw a perpendicular line in the 
dendrogram to the abscissa axis -passing through the point 7.5 of the rescaled distance- it is 
noted that the number of lines intersected by such theoretic axis reaches to 2, which indicates 
that the number of clusters or conglomerates should be 2. 
2.2. - The variables 
In our work we have utilized primary sources of information, which have proved to be 
valuable since responses were obtained from all the systems that comprised the entire population, 
so statistical inference was not required. 
The presentation of results is divided into five thematic sections: legal and regulatory 
form, financial rebonding, associations to the financial system, products and operations, and 
statistical data and key figures. 
On the other hand, the variables that have enabled us to establish a typology for guarantee 
systems in Latin America, in terms of its institutional characteristics, are as follows: 
a) The legal form of the entity that operates the guarantee (V1) 
The concept of "legal personality" indicates, by itself, a legal establishment and, 
ultimately, a transcendent nature intended to exercise any activity in any field of the economic 
and commercial subject. The same is applied to the sector of guarantee systems. 
Three variables are conclusively proposed to be employed from this construct: a) 
corporate entities (this value is presented as V1.1), b) the public entities and institutions (V1.2), 
and c) the foundations or non-profit entities (V1.3). 
b) The functionality of the entity that operates the guarantee (V2) 
This variable distinguishes the guarantee operators that support the financial collateral on their 
own assets from those that are mere administrators of an autonomous and liquid asset -as a fund- 
or trustees of a trust that support guarantee coverage. This distinction is really important since it 
lets us know whether the operator embodies a guarantee entity that exerts its own function as 
such or just merely supervises an autonomous and liquid resource endowed for such purpose. 
Three different scenario are proposed from this variable: a) an entity that directly grants and 
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supports guarantees with its own capital (V2.1), b) a mere administrative entity of a guarantee or 
risk fund (V2.2); c) a mere fiduciary entity of a trust (a mere trustee that manages a trust and is 
identified as the actual operator of the guarantee) (V2.3). 
c) The responsibility of the entity that operates the Guarantee. 
This variable sets apart those guarantee operators that back the guarantee coverage with their 
own wealth from those that do not take risk on their own assets. The variable embodies two 
possibilities: a) an entity that assumes the risk from its own financial equity (it is responsible for 
the guarantee coverage to third parties with its own capital or assets) (V3.1) and b) a body that 
do not assume the risk of guarantee coverage from its own financial equity (it is not responsible, 
materially speaking, for guarantee coverage) (V3.2). 
d) The capitalization of the guarantee scheme. 
This variable differentiates those guarantee systems capitalized by net equity from those 
capitalized by an autonomous and liquid resource. The variable can adopt two variants: a) by the 
use of net equity or own financial resources -part of the equity- under the corporate and/or legal 
figure corresponding to the legal entity that operates the guarantee coverage (V4.1) and b) by the 
utilization of an autonomous liquid resource (guarantee fund, risk fund, guarantee trust, etc.) 
managed by a third party -which is the one that operates the guarantee coverage- that does not 
integrate these resources in its equity account. (V4.2). 
e)  The administration of the resources. 
This variable is to distinguish how to manage the guarantee system resources. The variable 
raised two options: a) an administration conducted by corporate or societary governing bodies -
representing the capital of the entity that provides or operates the guarantee (direction, advice 
board, general board, etc.) (V5 1) and b) an administration performed by a third party (public 
institutions, private or international agencies, etc.) to manage the autonomous and liquid resource 
that provides guarantee coverage (V5.2). 
2.3. - The population 
For this work, the research instrument was a survey that had been previously used and contrasted 
(Pombo, Molina and Ramirez, 2006b and Pombo, Molina and Ramirez, 2007) to study the 
structure of guarantee systems in Europe and America. The questionnaire was answered by the 
responsible authorities of the guarantee entities. The answers obtained were double checked 
against information (published on paper and online) concerning these entities, and have 
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undergone a consistency analysis between data, proceeding to clarify all the doubts that arose in 
connection with the stakeholders. 
Table 1: Origin, Seniority, and Number of Guarantee Systems and Entities in 2010 
Guarantee System/Entity (Name) Country Year # of Entities 
 
 
Gran Total   83 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
The sample practically coincides with the total Latin American population, consisting of 
30 security systems or schemes: three (3) of them are found in North America, seven (7) in 
Central America, and twenty in South America. They all represent eighty-three (83) guarantee 
entities in operation (one extinct but still with data). There are no known guarantee schemes or 
systems operating in Guatemala or Dominican Republic; for the case of Panama, its not so 
relevant guarantee program was not included due to the impossibility to obtain accurate data. It is 
specified that not only Argentina and Venezuela, but also El Salvador, Brazil, and Uruguay have 
procured their own legislative frameworks, for those systems of reciprocal guarantee companies 
or assimilated societies, to develop a certain number of reciprocal guarantee societies, mutual 
societies, and homogeneous societies. 
Nombre del sistema o ente de garantía País Año Nº de entes 
Programa de Garantías NAFIN México 1997 1 
FEGA del FIRA México 1972 1 
SAGARPA-FONAGA México 2003 1 
PROGARA El Salvador 2000 1 
PROGAPE El Salvador 2000 1 
PROGAIN El Salvador 2002 1 
Garantías y Servicios, SGR, SA de CV El Salvador 2001 1 
IMAS-BANCRÉDITO-BNCR Costa Rica 2002 1 
FINADE Costa Rica 2008 1 
FODEIMIPYME Costa Rica 2002 1 
FOGABA Argentina 1995 1 
SGR Argentina Argentina 1995 24 
FONDO DE GARANTÍA PROPYME UNIÓN Bolivia 2010 1 
FAMPE-SEBRAE Brasil 1995 1 
FGPC-BNDES (extinguido) Brasil 1997 1 
FGI-BNDES Brasil 2009 1 
FUNPROGER-BB Brasil 1999 1 
FGO-BB Brasil 2009 1 
AGC da Serra Gaucha Brasil 2004 1 
FOGAPE-BANESTADO Chile 1980 1 
Programa de Garantía de COBEX CORFO Chile 2001 1 
Programa de Garantían FOGAIN CORFO Chile 2007 1 
IGR de CHILE Chile 2007 10 
FAG-FINAGRO Colombia 1985 1 
FNG, SA Colombia 1982 1 
FONDO DE GARANTÍA CREDITICIA FOGAMYPE Ecuador 2009 1 
FOGAPI  Perú 1979 1 
FONDO DE GARANTÍA EMPRESARIAL (FOGEM) Perú 2009 1 
Sistema Nacional de Garantías SIGA Uruguay 2009 1 
SGR-Venezuela Venezuela 1990 22 
TOTAL 
  
83 
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There have been identified, as well, programs from multilateral institutions: experiences 
that, in any case, are no longer operating and, therefore, left out of our study. 
Although the number of observations is limited, the sample enjoys of a great 
representation since it almost involves the complete population of cases; thus, it is not necessary 
to make any extrapolation of results.  
3. Results for the guarantee systems or schemes in Latin America 
3.1. - Descriptive results 
The main global descriptive results reflect the typology of the existing guarantee systems or 
entities in Latin America, and let us know information concerning their particular activities and 
evolutions. For the presentation of the results, we have proceeded to describe a scheme similar to 
that previously utilized for the European (Pombo, Molina and Ramirez, 2006b) and American 
cases (Pombo, Molina and Ramirez, 2007). Thus, we have divided our analysis into seven 
sections: 1) institutional framework, 2) origin of resources and decision-making, 3) activity and 
scope of users, 4) characteristics of the rebonding, 5) association to financial system, 6) 
characteristics of products and services, and 7) evolution of guarantee systems in Latin America. 
3.1.1. - Institutional framework 
The institutional analysis highlights that the Latin American systems happen to be 
regulated in the majority of cases: 70% by specific legislation -compared with the 30% covered 
by the general legislation of the country. If this is combined with the existence of certain specific 
regulations procured in all the countries where there is a guarantee system, the interest of 
numerous States to regulate the specificity of these sorts of entities and develop the concrete 
tools to address the problematic of guarantees can be more than confirmed. 
A second feature to note is the predominant existence of just a single guarantee entity. In 
30% of cases, the guarantee bodies act subordinated to a guarantee system; that is to say, within 
a legal framework that promotes the development of homogeneous guarantee entities (e.g. the 
reciprocal guarantee societies in Argentina, Venezuela, El Salvador, Chile, etc.) compared to 
those -the remaining 70%- which are mere individual and independent entities (e.g. the 
Argentinean society known as FOGABA S.A., the Mexican programs called SAGARPA-
FONAGA and NAFIN, or the Colombian corporation referred to as FNG, among others.). 
The relevant role of governments in the implementation of guarantee schemes goes 
beyond the establishment of a specific regulation, taking part as well of the conformation of 
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those actors who will operationalize the collaterals. As can be observed, the institutions or 
entities within the public sphere are predominant (66%), followed by mutual corporations (17%), 
non-mutual corporation (10%), and non-profit foundations (7%) -like AGC foundation in Serra 
de Gaucha (Brazil) and the FOGAPI foundation in Peru; both have, within their own resources, 
direct or indirect business participation (bringing together business chambers). 
These results illustrate the predominance of public sector in the provision of resources to 
the guarantee entities or systems, when it comes to their capitalization or rebonding schemes. In 
fact, this condition has increased in recent years. 
In public institutions, the activity is performed through a public body, with capital or 
financial resources integrated into its own equity account (bank or public development agency; 
company, entity, or public institution, etc.), or through a public and autonomous liquid source - 
called guarantee funds (GF) with delegated administration, or guarantee trusts with public capital 
and managed directly or vicariously by a trustee. 
Figure 1. Legal form Figure 2. Integration to the financial system  
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
On the other hand, more than three quarters of the entities that operate or manage 
guarantee systems are financial or assimilated institutions (87%), even when the funds or trusts 
do not share the same origin. As financial institutions, the 87% of them are subjected to financial 
regulation and supervision conducted by the supervisory agency. The guarantees given are 
qualified and weighted for the 90% of the systems, so that it allows them to reduce the capital 
and provisions requirements for the lending banks. The large presence of guarantee trusts and 
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funds ensures that the responsibility of the entity that operates the guarantee remains out of risk 
on its assets over the losses; only the 30% of cases assume the risk on their equity. 
The function of the guarantee operator is highly characterized (see figure 3). The figure 
of trusts, in which the operators act as trustees, prevails in a more significant percentage (40%): 
while 30% of the systems operators manage a fund, the remaining 30% supports with their own 
financial equity the guarantee granted. In the first two figures is traced a line between the 
operator’s equity and the fund it supports; the capitalization of the systems is accomplished in a 
30% of the cases with their own resources/capital and in a 70% with an autonomous liquid 
resource that is not integrated into the guarantee operator's equity. 
Figure 3. Functionality of the operator Figure 4. Type of audit  
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
The contractual characteristics of guarantees in relation to Basel II are quite 
homogeneous and, as indicated above, qualified and weighted. Guarantees, therefore, 
substantially meet the contractual features of being direct (individual guarantees should represent 
a direct protection on behalf of the guarantor), explicit (credit protection should be linked to 
specific financial exposures; its scope should be clearly defined and incontrovertible), 
irrevocable (no contractual clause should allow the guarantor to cancel unilaterally the credit 
coverage, increase the cost of protection, restrict the demand expiration, and avoid a payment in 
a timely manner), and enforceable (in all the competent jurisdictions). In addition, the guarantee 
payment is often conditioned: only the 23% are unconditional (no contractual clause prevents the 
guarantor to pay, in a timely manner, if there is a default). 
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Due to the high percentage of public institutions, a large number of guarantee entities are 
audited by public audits (63%). These entities are generally subject to external audits (97% of the 
cases). When there are no external audits, these are performed by public sector representatives; 
only in 63% of the cases, they resort to internal auditors as a means to inspect their accounts and 
internal control systems. It has to be kept in mind that many of the guarantee systems or 
schemes, or even their operators, are supervised (87%): only 23% of the systems preserve their 
quality processes certified. 
3.1.2. – Origin of the resources and decision-making 
Governments play a significant role in the capitalization of guarantee schemes. The 
structure of Latin American business fabric
3
 determines and gives reasons for a more active 
support from the States to facilitate access to credit, as observed in the guarantee systems of most 
Latin American countries (Pombo and Ramírez Molina 2007a).  
In Latin America, 63% of the entities put only and exclusively into operation public 
resources, while a 27% of them manage, as a majority portion, public funds. Given this 
remarkable total of 90%, a 10% turns to be of mixed nature: 7% of private majority and 3% of 
just private. This predominant situation, in terms of public participation, has increased in recent 
years. 
Figure 5. Origin of resources Figure 6. Resources from each sector involved 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
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 It represents, by and large, 99% of the companies in the region; its contribution is important in terms of employment, less relevant in 
production, and slighly relevant in exports, Stumpo, G. (2012) 
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Capitalization form and resource origin are crucial in the conformation of the different 
guarantee system/scheme models and their modus operandi in Latin America. As we will 
confirm, this form of capitalization, based on a strong provision of public funds, determines a 
specific manner of administration that is materialized through the figures of guarantee trusts or 
funds, and performed by an operator -different from the contributor of resources- that does not 
assume the operation risks on its own financial assets. The guarantee operator is usually a 
financial entity instead of a development bank. 
The public support mechanisms are: contributions to risk coverage funds (80%) -
guarantee funds or trusts-, contributions to permanent resources in the form of capital (20%), 
contributions to leverage expected losses (13%), concessions to refinancing programs
4
 (20%), 
subsidies to the guarantee costs (17%), and tax exemptions (23%). Autonomous liquid resources 
-guarantee funds or trusts- are a characteristic capitalization formula of public nature supporting 
Latin American guarantee schemes/systems. 
Figure 7. Supports provided by public sector 
(Destination) 
Figure 8. System administration 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
With respect to the control of the entities, in a 70% of cases the administration is carried 
out by third parties (such as guarantee fund or trust administrators), compared to the 30% in 
which the governing boards of the operating guarantee entity is the one that manages the capital 
resources and executes the activity. The predominance of the public sector leads to a reduced 
                                                             
4 The guarantee coverage scheme -of second floor- is a predeterminated percentage of the transactions secured by the guarantee entities or 
systems on the first-tier floor. 
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participation of the beneficiaries in the resources, governance, and grant decisions, which 
distances decision-makers from beneficiaries in the knowledge of their needs. 
A general characteristic is the moderate participation of the beneficiaries in the permanent 
resources and governing bodies (for both cases, it is practically null at the 80% and 66% of the 
cases, respectively). 
Participation in the decision of granting guarantee is also very low -10% of the 
participation happens to be direct and 3% indirect
5
. 
Figure 9. Participation of beneficiaries in: resources, control, 
and decision-making 
Figure 10. Guarantee activity level  
  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
3.1.3. - Guarantee system activity: characteristics and scope of users 
One third of the guarantee systems or entities dedicate themselves exclusively to the 
guarantee activity (30%). Collateral activity turns to be quiet relevant -over 50% of the operator 
activity- in a 20% of the systems and not relevant in a 50% of them. With regard to Latin 
America, for the models of capitalization through guarantee funds and trusts, it has been taken 
into account the situation of the administrators or executors of the fund and/or trustees of the 
trust; since these entities are financial institutions, their guarantee system administrators do not 
perform exclusively the guarantee activity and, in many cases, it is considered as non relevant 
issue. 
The beneficiaries are usually the MSMEs; not for nothing is this policy of guarantee 
qualification being implemented to tackle the micro (83%), small (93%), and medium (53%) 
business problem of getting access to funding. For this reason, there is virtually no attention to 
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large business by guarantee systems in Latin America (7%); some specific cases of guarantee 
entities that provide services to large companies are CORFO-PROGAIN and COBEX programs, 
both located in Chile. 
Figure 11. Size of beneficiaries Figure 12. Geographical scope of action 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
The guarantee systems activity is basically circumscribed to the national or federal sphere 
(93%) and poorly to the regional or state one (7%). It is observed as well that the guarantee 
systems or entities are predominantly intersectoral (83%). As intersectoral guarantee systems, in 
particular for the agricultural sector, are included the following: FAG -Colombia-, PROGARA 
and PROGAIN -El Salvador-, FEGA de FIRA and SAGARPA -Mexico-; they all combined 
represent the 26.90% of the beneficiaries and the 19.77% of the current guarantees in Latin 
America for 2010. 
Figure 13. Sector and temporality. Figure 14. Source of rebonding 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Those systems with limited and temporary resources (60%) have in common that their resources 
come from the public sector
6 
and, consequently, the level of dependency and temporality to this 
financial source turns to be critical. On the other hand, the guarantee systems/schemes of 
indefinite nature or with permanent resources (40%) demonstrate by themselves the will for 
permanence in time by some of these schemes; for that, they frequently implement corporate 
formulas for their organizational structures. 
3.1.4. - Characteristics of the rebonding system 
The rebonding system allows the guarantee entities to redistribute the risk involved in the 
activity of the collateral. However, this instrument is not often utilized to channel financial 
support at government level in Latin America. Significantly, the 80% of the guarantee systems or 
entities in the region do not put into practice this instrument. Only 20% of the cases benefit from 
a national rebonding that focuses on those systems of first-tier societies -such as the RGS's 
(reciprocal guarantee societies) or mutual companies-, as it would not make sense for a national 
public rebonding to assist national public bodies. The systems in Latin America with rebonding 
are: NAFIN, the Salvadorian RGS's (the FDSGR Trust), the Venezuelan RGS's (FONPYME, 
SA), the Chilean RGI's (FOGAPE and CORFO), and the Argentine RGS's (FOGABA and 
FOGAPYME). 
Figure 15. Characteristics of the rebonding Figure 16. Rebonding coverage in % 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
                                                             
6
  The resources of permanent nature are typical of societary schemes -intended to be permanent since its formal 
establishment-, while the resources of public programs exhibite a strong temporal nature. 
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Finally, as part of the policy of public support for the attainment of guarantee, the 
systems or entities receive the rebonding free of charge in 17% of cases (just 1 of 6), compared 
to 83% that use it with charges or fees. This cost ranges from 0.20% to 1% annually on current 
balances. The average for the maximum coverage reaches 56% of the operation, while the 
average for the rebonding coverage stands at 41%. In all cases, the rebonding scheme and 
counter-guarantee are perceivably understood, in the context of Basel II, as an effect to reduce 
their own capital and provisions; this effect gives important added value to their coverage. 
3.1.5. – Institutional relations with the financial system 
The receivers of the guarantee are usually financial institutions (for all cases -100% -, banking 
sector happens to be the receptor of the guarantee). Further receiving entities are: other financial 
institutions (27%), other companies and institutions (13%), the public sector (13%), and some 
venture capital companies (0%). 
Figure 17. Guarantee Receptors  Figure 18. Responsibility and form of response   
  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The responsibility of the systems or entities are usually revealed with subsidiary nature in 
77% of the cases, while 23% of them take place on a joint and several basis, which is consistent 
with the public origin of the resources. In 80% of the cases, the systems respond for the covered 
percentage, while 20% do so for the estimating expected losses. Consistent with the foregoing, 
the most frequent type of default notice is the conditional (77%); this links to a greater extent 
lenders and beneficiaries, which undermines the effectiveness of the guarantee system/scheme 
regarding the financial sector -financial institutions should go first against the beneficiary-, and 
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contributes to a greater moral hazard coverage for the sake of the guarantee system or scheme. 
The payment is made for delinquent cases in 47% and for failed in 53%. 
The guarantee documentation is usually arranged with a financial entity under the 
modality of portfolio management contract (53%) or through the issuance of a guarantee 
certificate from the guarantee operator (40%) to the beneficiary itself. In 7% of cases, the 
guarantee contracts are associated with a concrete loan that is secured directly by the guarantee 
entity. 33% of all these contracts or documents are formalized with the intervention of a public 
notary. 
Figure 19. Guarantee administration Figure 20. Guarantee mechanism 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
Guarantee happens to be individual in 23% of cases, compared to the portfolio guarantee 
that turns to be 77%. All these characteristics or variables are in some way related
7
, in the sense 
that within those systems where public capital results predominant, the financial hedges tend to 
be lower
8
; in other words, they are shared with the financial institution to reduce moral hazard 
and improve the sustainability of the system in the long run. The average coverage level, as a 
desirable practice, is in line with Levitsky’s suggestions (1997). 
                                                             
7
  Pombo (2006b) and Pombo, Molina, and Ramirez (2006 and 2008) state that a higher percentage of coverage, a 
greater cost saving in guaranteed financial transactions, and a fixed price in guarantee service characterize the 
mutual systems/schemes in European. The financial sector particularly appreciates a high coverage percentage 
because it is this measure that allows it to make better use of the rating of its assets, reducing capital requirements 
and provisions and, ultimately, risk mitigation (Basel Accords). This, among other things, clarifies the best 
capacity to negotiate the terms of the "mutual" loans. 
8
  Pombo (2006b) and Pombo, Molina, and Ramirez (2006 and 2008) claim that a higher average coverage 
percentage of the guarantee characterizes the group of a private majority. In our case, the relation has the same 
trend but it is not statistically significant. 
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On the contrary, the mechanism is predominantly of portfolio guarantee and the analysis 
is usually delegated to the financial institutions; that allows the involved entities to save 
management costs, being consistent with a system typology in which the knowledge of the 
borrower resides in the financial entity). Our data highlight a significant relationship between the 
entrepreneurial participation, a responsibility profile in the joint guarantee, and a payment 
mechanism on first claim (the payment for a failed loan by itself is already a constraint).  
 
Figure 21. Institutional relations with the financial 
systems 
Figure 22. Analysis of the operations 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
The institutional relation with the banking system is of an open or multibank nature in a 
97%. The practice of just one bank (3%) to operate exclusively with a credit network or 
institution is sparsely widespread: only for the case of IMAS BANCREDITO from Costa Rica 
(in reference to public bank). 
Consistent with the systems that secure portfolios, the analysis is delegated to the 
financial entity, which provides the loan in 80% of cases. However, the type of analysis for the 
operations turns to be internal in 20% of cases. This corresponds with a delegation of the 
decision to grant guarantee to the financial institution in 73% of cases. This procedure involves 
moving the risk assessment to financial intermediaries. 
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Figure 23. Guaranteed concepts  Figure 24. Average percentage for maximum 
coverage 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
The Latin American guarantee schemes or systems, in more than half of cases (57%), 
ensure just the principal of the operations; 23% of systems guarantee interest and principal and 
20% include, in addition to the above, default interest. 
Figure 25. Coverage level Figure 26. Type of products and services 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
The average for the maximum coverage percentage stands at 79.33% of the operations, 
with a reduced standard deviation of 20.11%. Meanwhile, the average coverage for the usual 
percentage happens to be 60.10% of the transaction amount, with also a reduced standard 
deviation of 21.34%. 
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3.1.6. - Characteristics of products and services 
The guarantees offered by the entities and systems are usually financial guarantees (93%), 
technical guarantees (17%), and financial advisory services related or linked to the guarantee 
operation (27%). 
Figure 27.  Application by products and services            Figure 28. Average price by cost and products 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
The application of guarantee to investments in fixed assets is expected in virtually most 
of the systems (97%) -in all of them to the working capital (100%)-, being this somewhat lower 
to export operations (40%). It is only applies to leasing transactions in 33% of cases, to risk 
capital in 0%, and to public tenders in 20%. Financial advisory activity occurs in 27% of cases. 
The pricing policy is heterogeneous. 14% of the guarantee entities apply a fixed cost to 
all the operations and in 79% of cases the cost is differentiated. Nonpublic systems exhibit as a 
whole tiered pricing systems; however, public systems utilized both fixed and tiered pricing 
systems. Among the most important factors of cost differentiation are payment period/term and 
probability of default, followed by the percentage of coverage, the amount and type of operation, 
and the rating of the company. In 93% of the cases, the guarantee user assumes a cost – being 
this the average guarantee fee (guarantee)- of 2.51% on the amount covered per year. 
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Figure 29. Pricing policy Figure 30.  Factors for price differentiation 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
Some entities charge no cost to MSMEs
9
 users; two examples are IMAS BANCREDITO 
from Costa Rica and SAGARPA-FONAGA from Mexico. 
The mean for the maximum guarantee period is 106 months, while the mean for the 
average guarantee period turns out to be 34 months; thus, we can state that the granting of 
guarantees is executed keeping in mind a short-term horizon and fundamentally supporting 
operations of this nature. In 47% of cases, the predominant period of the portfolio happens to be 
between 1 and 3 years. The mean for the maximum guaranteed amount is U.S. $ 1,098,970 while 
the mean for the average guaranteed amount is U.S. $ 40,344; these two figures register a high 
deviation. 
Figure 31. Means for maximum and average period Figure 32. Dominant period of the portfolio 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
                                                             
9
  In these cases and others, such as the guarantee programs from Canada or the U.S. SBA program, the financial 
entity is the one that pays the cost for guarantee services although later it can pass on to the beneficiary within the 
interest rate that is charged for the loan. 
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The surveyed entities point out that in 90% of cases the access, through the guarantee 
system or entity, implies a cheapening of the financial costs -specifically a 50% of the 
respondents cite a cost improvement of more than 3% (figure 34)-. This reflects and confirms 
that guarantee systems not only allow access to financing, but also perform an important role by 
providing lower interest rates, which facilitates access to long terms. This finding reveals 
additionality in 90% of the systems since its intervention entails some sort of reduction for the 
MSME’s financing cost. 
Figure 33. Maximum and average amount Figure 34. Financial cost saving  
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
3.1.7. – Evolution of guarantee systems in Latin America 
The general evolution of these entities has been characterized by a remarkable growth in 
this precise economic period in which the global economy has suffered a major adjustment; this 
has probably affected to a lesser extent the Latin American Countries. The average values, 
presented in Table 2, clearly indicate an increase in the number of beneficiary MSMEs (15.5% 
between 2007 and 2010) since the activity these systems achieve needs time to get consolidated. 
This growth requires increase in permanent resources; these have nearly doubled -from 104,616 
to 188,123 thousands of US dollars- within the period under consideration  
As a result of the above, current guarantees have also doubled at annual year-end during 
2007-2010 period, escalating from 359,548 to 641,215 thousands of U.S. dollars. The mobilized 
credit has increased a 75.7%, with a high turnover in the operations, as the mobilized credit and 
granted guarantees for all the exercises are close to or above the year-end balance. 
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The seniority of these entities is relatively short in time; thus, it is still unveiled their 
ability to mobilized credit in many of the cases. A 53.30% of them have less than 10 years and 
30% less than five (by 2010). 
Table 2: Average values for the activity of guarantee systems/schemes from 2007 to 2010 
In thousands of U.S. $ 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of beneficiary SMEs 67.542 61.824 60.255 77.999 
Permanent resources 104.616 118.310 166.852 188.123 
Current guarantee (portfolio) 359.548 393.354 519.304 641.215 
Formalized guarantees by year 366.555 366.487 424.603 641.290 
Beneficiary SMEs by year-end 35.821 27.554 31.095 48.599 
Balance/mobilized credit portfolio
10
 602.978 642.537 816.391 1.059.899 
Mobilized credit by year 705.854 655.352 841.259 1.090.726 
Source: Own elaboration 
Support for the access to guarantee is a key for the door of credit, and the systems -both 
for the mobilized credit and for the number of beneficiary MSMEs- turn to be a public policy 
that contributes to benefit access for financing SMEs under the best conditions. 
Moreover, the development of Latin American guarantee systems or schemes has been 
spectacular both in average values and in grand totals (see figures 35, 36, and 37). 
Figure 35. Evolution of average values for the main magnitudes 1998-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 1998-2010 data series 
For all the periods of reference, both in average (Figures 35 and 36) and in absolute 
values (Figures 36 and 37), it is observed a very strong and positive progression with a big boost 
as of 2008. In 2007 and 2008, there is a certain slowdown in the figures, even with a slight 
decrease of the assisted SMEs per year, growing back as of 2008. 
                                                             
10 The mobilized credit amount is associated with all the credit transactions with guarantee coverage. It generally exceeds the guarantee coverage 
amount as this is usually lower than the credit received by the beneficiaries. 
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Figure 36. Evolution in average and absolute values for beneficiary SMEs 1998-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 1998-2010 data series 
Figure 37. Evolution of absolute values for main magnitudes 1998-2010 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 1998-2010 data series 
If these systems are analyzed according to their legal characterization, it can be observed 
that the average performance happens to be different. For this purpose, we distinguish, on the 
one hand, the mutual and mercantile companies and, on the other hand, the public institutions 
and the non-profit foundations that often operate through guarantee programs. 
In guarantee programs (70% of the systems), the system pivots on an resource or 
autonomous liquid financial equity that is allocated for the purpose of supporting collaterals; this 
is managed by an entity that tries to define the policies needed in accordance with the type of 
credits, entrepreneurs, periods, or risks -among others- taken by each of the parties that wants to 
assume the fund. However, the direct relation with the borrower is often delegated to the 
financial intermediary, as its instrumentation through a portfolio guarantee happens to be 
frequent. By contrast, these companies (30% of systems) base their business model on the direct 
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knowledge of the borrower, analyzing the credit quality of the borrower. The risk of this model 
lies in balancing an attractive guarantee for the financial system -which must assume a 
significant portion of the risk- with the moral hazard that can be adopted by the financial system 
as its functionality for the analysis of operations declines. 
In the corporate model, proximity to the borrower can be instrumentalized through a 
network of entities -such as the reciprocal guarantee societies-, which is in charge of interacting 
directly with borrowers. On the contrary, in the case of the programs, since the delegation of the 
commercial and analytic work is transferred to the financial institutions, these programs usually 
set up themselves with a single entity. The figure 38 reveals a very similar behavior for the two 
models, both in terms of the number of beneficiary SMEs and in terms of the balance for the 
collaterals portfolio. The dissimilar dimension, however, is not proportional to the difference in 
capitalization between systems of different models -in 2010, the programs exhibited a permanent 
resource average of 221,493 thousands of U.S. dollars, against the 110,259 thousands that 
belonged to the corporations-; it brings as consequence a greater impact of corporations on the 
programs both for the number of beneficiary MSMEs and for the current guarantee balance. 
Figure 38. Distribution of entities by model and territory  
  
Source: Own elaboration. 1998-2010 data series 
If we analyze the systems distribution, taking into account the geographical areas (South 
and Central America and Mexico), we can observe in figure 38 how the schemes with a larger 
number of entities are found in South America; this is mainly because the guarantee systems of 
mutual nature, developed and based on homogeneous corporations, are all practically 
concentrated in Argentina, Venezuela, and Chile. 
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Furthermore, South American systems assist on average a greater number of 
beneficiaries, compared with Central America and Mexico, due to the large volume of cases 
supported by several Brazilians entities, the FAG S.A., and the FAG from Colombia (Figure 39). 
In this regard, it has to be pointed out that the guarantee system known as FEGA del FIRA and 
SAGARPA from Mexico has established its data based on the guarantees granted to producer 
groups called FINCAS. If it were taken into account the direct beneficiaries, the producers, and 
the farmers, it would be surpassed the one million beneficiaries. 
Figure 39. Distribution of MSMEs by model and geographical areas 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 1998-2010 data series 
On the other hand, the current guarantees averages (Figure 40) increase steadily in both 
geographical areas and beneficiaries, although the difference is not as pronounced as in the case 
of the latter.  
Figure 40. Distribution of current guarantees by model and geographical areas 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 1998-2010 data series 
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Figure 41. Distribution of mobilized credit by model and geographical areas 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 1998-2010 data series 
Concerning the mobilized credit, it can be observed in figure 41 how in Central America 
and Mexico this variable turns to be slightly higher than the value registered in South America, 
even though the collateral amount happens to be lower. The mobilized credit has increasingly 
evolved both in terms of the number of guarantee programs and companies (Figure 41). 
For its part, guarantee systems are significantly present in the agricultural sector (20% of 
the general activity). The sectoral systems (Figure 42) mobilize a higher average number of 
beneficiary MSMEs, compared to those of intersectoral nature, although, as discussed above, the 
final beneficiaries are not computed for the particular case of Mexico. 
Figure 42. Average beneficiary MSMEs by sectoral classification 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 1998-2010 data series 
This systems growth is generating a greater efficiency in the use of permanent resources, 
even though they currently maintain a solvency structure with core capital levels, understanding 
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this ratio -measured as permanent resources divided between current guarantees- close to the 
value 30. In this sense, the agricultural sectoral guarantee entities are 16 points above the former 
value. 
Table 3: Core capital and additionality from 2007 to 2010 
Core capital and additionality 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Core capital = 100x (Permanent 
resources/Guarantees) 
29,10 30,08 32,13 29,34 
Additionality = (Mobilized Credit/ 
Permanent public resources) 
8,95 7,22 6,00 7,30 
Annual additionality = (Mobilized 
Credit in the exercise/ Permanent public 
resources) 
10,55 8,13 8,45 9,61 
Source: Own elaboration 
On the other hand, the level of additionality -measured as the credit mobilized with the 
permanent resources provided by public sector- reached the 7.30 in 2010, being very similar 
during the last three years and slightly higher for 2007 (Table 12). The evolution turns similar 
when analyzed by annual grants. In 2008, there was a mobilized credit crunch, within the 
economic exercise, and a credit balance slowdown; this fact explains the drop in the additionality 
of public resources. 
The core capital levels by system and country reveal that some systems are still in the 
initial launch phase, which is the case of Bolivia and Ecuador and some others with an excess of 
permanent resource on the needs that the guarantee activity claims for itself -as in 
FODEYPYME from Costa Rica. It seems clear in which countries the guarantee activity seems 
more intensive: Brazil, Chile, and Colombia; this ratio registers a similar level just above 20%, 
exhibiting a greater efficiency in the use of the involved but certainly surplus resources, in 
accordance with the recommendations of Basel II and III. In the case of Mexico, the core capital 
almost doubles with respect to the three aforementioned countries. 
Finally, we should not forget when analyzing the additionality that a large number of 
guarantee systems manages, with its participation, to reduce the MSMEs’ financing costs. This 
finding reveals a additionality in 90% of the systems, as shown in Figure 34 on page 23. 
3.2. - Classification of the systems 
Table 4 depicts the dendrogram for the hierarchical cluster analysis where it can be 
observed two conglomerates. 
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Table 4. Dendrogram for classification of guarantee systems in Latin America 
Dendrogram utilizing an average relation (between groups) 
Cluster Combination with rescaled distance 
 
Source. Own elaboration 
The allocation for each different cluster or group observation is displayed in Table 5. 
 Table 5. Cluster allocations for the different systems 
GUARANTEE SYSTEMS / ENTITIES  Clusters 
NAFIN Guarantee Program, FEGA DEL FIRA, SAGARPA-FONAGA, 
PROGARA, PROGAPE, PROGAIN, IMAS-BANCREDITO-BNCR, 
FINADE, FODEIMIPYME, SGR Argentina, GUARANTEE FUND PRO 
PYME UNION, FGI-BNDES, FGPC-BNDES, FUNPROGER-BB, FGO-
BB, IGR Chile, FAG-FINAGRO, POGAMYPE CREDIT GUARANTEE 
FUND, FOGAPI, FOGEM BUSINESS GUARANTEE FUND, SIGA 
National Guarantee System  
1 
GyS SGR FOGABA, FAMPE-SEBRAE, AGC da Serra Gaucha, FOGAPE-
BANESTADO, COBEX CORFO Guarantee Program, FOGAIN CORFO 
Guarantee Program, FNG, SA, SGR-Venezuela 
2 
Source. Own elaboration 
The first conglomerate registered twenty-one guarantee systems and the second just nine 
observations. This interpretation is supported by the distance matrix results. The group 
homogeneity degree within each cluster justifies its structure of two blocks and no less than that. 
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In summary, the hierarchical cluster analysis, along with the additional information in Table 6, 
presents two basic situations: 
1. A group or set of guarantee coverage operator (entities/systems) that supports the collateral 
on its own financial equity (making a total of 9 entities) through legal/business corporations 
or public entities -FNG, SA (25), SGR-Venezuela (30), GYS SGR (7), FOGABA (11), 
CORFO-COBEX (21); CORFO-FOGAIN (22), FAMPE (14), FOGAPE (20), and AGC 
from Serra Gaucha (19) 
Within this group there are two distinct clusters that stand out as being very homogeneous in 
terms of: 
1.1. Group or set of guarantee coverage operators (entities/schemes) that supports the collateral 
on its own financial equity and represents legal companies or business corporations in four 
situations (of which three are of mutual nature)   
1.2. Group or set of guarantee coverage operators (entities/schemes) that supports this collateral 
on its own financial equity and represents public and non-profit institutions in four and one 
case respectively. 
Figure 43. Empirical scheme of classification for Latin American guarantee systems (by groups) 
 
 
Source. Own elaboration 
2. A group or set of guarantee coverage operators (entities/systems) that does not support the 
collateral on its own financial equity but merely manages an autonomous liquid resource -
guarantee trusts or funds- (up to a total of 21): PROPYME FUND (13), SIGA (29), SGR 
Argentina (12), IGR Chile (23), FGO (18), FAG (24), SAGARPA-FONAGA (3), FGPC 
(16), FUNPROGER (17), FODEMIPYME (10), FGI (15), FOGAMYPE (26), FOGEM (28), 
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NAFIN (1), IMAS (8), FINADE (9), PROGAPE (5), PROGAIN ELS (6), FEGA DEL FIRA 
(2), PROGARA (4), and FOGAPI (27). 
Within this group there are two distinct clusters that stand out as being very homogeneous in 
terms of: 
2.1. They are mostly public institutions that act as guarantee coverage operators; they do not 
support the collateral on their own financial equity, but do merely manage an autonomous 
liquid resource constituted by a guarantee trust or fund. There are 17 cases within this block, 
comprising a sort of group that is differentiated depending on whether its cases are 
guarantee funds (6 cases) or trusts (11 cases). 
2.2. Business corporations that play the role of guarantee coverage operators; they do not 
support the collateral on their own equity but do merely manage an autonomous liquid 
resource. There are four specific cases within this block characterized by operators with a 
legal personality of corporate society. It actually involves four observations that represent 
"deviations" or "hybrids"; that is, companies -two mutual societies- in administration of 
guarantee funds (two cases) and corporations in administration of trusts (two cases). 
There are, in each of the main group, two concrete or residual observations under the 
figure of foundations or nonprofit entities. 
Table 6 pinpoints the values, for the diverse systems, that are registered by the variables 
employed to establish the classification, from which we will be able to infer the features that 
shape the two groups of systems obtained after the dendrogram analysis. 
In the first place, it can be observed how legal personality does not appear to be the 
criterion by which guarantee systems are clustered, although it certainly exerts its influence on 
the subgroups. Our results indicate that other criteria happen to be more relevant, as the 
responsibility, the capitalization of the system, or how resources are managed. 
Thus, the variables that describe the functionality of the guarantee operator –in other 
words, whether they support the collateral with their own financial equity or manage an entrusted 
fund or trust- distinguish as well the two large clusters (figure 43).  
 V.2.1 operators that support the guarantee coverage on their own financial equity -first 
section and first column of the group: from FNG, SA (25) to AGC of Serra Gaucha (19) 
included (a total of 9 cases).  
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 V2.2 y v2.3 operators that do not support the guarantee coverage on their own financial 
equity -second section and first column of the group: from PROPYME UNION 
GUARANTEE FUND (13) to FGI (15) included (a total of 21 cases).  
Table 6. Cluster analysis and variables selected 
Clusters System/Scheme/Entity # Legal Form Functionality Responsibility Capitalization Administration 
v1.1   v1.2   v1.3 v2.1  v2.2  v2.3 v3.1      v3.2  v4.1   v4.2  v5.1   v5.2  
 
Source. Own elaboration 
As we move down the list of guarantee systems/schemes and entities from the first column, 
we practically go, in a successive sequence, from those that support the guarantee coverage with 
their own financial equity to those that do not. 
The variables v1.1 / v3.1 / v4.1 / v5.1, with respect to v1.2 / v1.3 / v3.2 / v4.2 / v5.2, clearly 
illustrate and highlight even further the differences between some groups and others. In the end, 
the legal form of the entity turns to be the variable -revealing certain differentiation nuances- that 
help set apart two distinct groups among those systems that assume guarantee coverage, and two 
other groups among those schemes that do not -although for this second block we have to clearly 
v1.1 v1.2 v1.3 v2.1 v2.2 v2.3 v3.1 v3.2 v4.1 v4.2 v5.1 v5.2
FNG, SA 25 X X X X X
SGR-VENEZUELA 30 X X X X X
GARANTIAS Y SERVICIOS, SGR - SA de CV 7 X X X X X
FOGABA 11 X X X X X
PROGRAMA DE GARANTIA COBEX CORFO 21 X X X X X
PROGRAMA DE GARANTIA FOGAIN CORFO 22 X X X X X
FAMPE-SEBRAE 14 X X X X X
FOGAPE-BANESTADO 20 X X X X X
AGC DA SERRA GAUCHA 19 X X X X X
FONDO DE GARANTIA PRO PYME UNION 13 X X X X X
SISTEMA NACIONAL DE GARANTIAS SIGA 29 X X X X X
SGR ARGENTINA 12 X X X X X
IGR CHILE 23 X X X X X
FGO-BB 18 X X X X X
FGA-FINAGRO 24 X X X X X
SAGARPA-FONAGA 3 X X X X X
FGPC-BNDES 16 X X X X X
FUNPROGER-BB 17 X X X X X
FODEIMIPYME 10 X X X X X
FGI 15 X X X X X
FONDO DE GARANTIA CREDITICIA FOGAMYPE 26 X X X X X
FONDO DE GARANTIA EMPRESARIAL FOGEM 28 X X X X X
PROGRAMA DE GARANTIA DE NAFIN 1 X X X X X
IMAS-BANCREDITO-BNCR 8 X X X X X
FINADE 9 X X X X X
PROGAPE 5 X X X X X
PROGAIN 6 X X X X X
FEGA DEL FIRA 2 X X X X X
PROGARA 4 X X X X X
FOGAPI 27 X X X X X
G
ru
po
 I
G
ru
po
 II
SISTEMA/ESQUEMA/ENTEClusters Nº
Forma jurídica Funcionalidad Responsabilidad Capitalización Administración
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differentiate the systems that manage guarantee funds from those that administer guarantee 
trusts. 
In brief, we have found two types of guarantee systems or schemes: one operating the 
guarantee coverage on its own financial equity (group 1) and another assuming no risk on its 
own assets -the operators of the guarantee coverage-  (group 2). 
From this perspective it could be concluded that an analysis of the different variables -
utilized for the examination of guarantee systems/schemes in Latin America-, in relation to the 
variable functionality of the guarantee operator, could clearly point out the differentiating 
characteristics from one group to another. In this sense -according to Table 7-, to exemplify the 
Group 2 (operators -entities/schemes- that do not support the guarantee coverage on their own 
financial equity but do merely manage a autonomous liquid resource), it turns to be that all the 
cases do not assume the risk on their own assets (v3.2); they represent schemes of capitalization 
based on autonomous liquid resources (V4.2), being controlled by third parties that operate as 
trustees of the guarantee activity (V5.2). 
Table 7. Characteristics of the guarantee systems according to certain variables 
Variables Operators that Assumes 
Coverage on it own 
Financial Equity 
Operators that Assumes no 
Coverage on it own 
Financial Equity 
Variable 1. Legal Personality  Both corporations and public 
institutions coexist simultaneously. 
Public institutions are largely 
present. 
Variable 2. Guarantee 
Operator’s Functionality 
They operate the guarantee coverage 
on their own financial equity. 
They operate the guarantee coverage 
as mere administrators of 
autonomous and liquid resources: 
guarantee funds or trusts provided 
by others. 
Variable 3. Responsibility for 
the Guarantee 
They assume the guarantee coverage 
on their own financial equity. 
They assume no guarantee coverage 
on their own financial equity. 
Variable 4. Capitalization Equity capital is the capitalization 
formula. 
Autonomous and liquid resources, 
guarantee funds or trusts, are the 
capitalization formula. 
Variable 5. Administration of 
Resources 
The resources are managed from 
corporate governing bodies (by their 
owners). 
The resources are managed by the 
operator (different from the owner or 
contributor of resources). 
 
4. Conclusion 
The analysis of the guarantee systems in Latin America reveals a tendency to the growth, 
development, and implementation of both existing and novel experiences -recently launched 
projects that will certainly culminate in imminent realities-. The activity has grown tenfold in the 
last decade and virtually all the territories are served by guarantee systems. 
36 
Additionally, the State plays an important role in the implementation and development of 
guarantee systems, coexisting even in an incipient form with mixed systems of private nature; at 
present, it highlights the relevance of public guarantee programs, without underestimating an 
remarkable boost of private and public mixed systems/schemes as SGR's. Nowadays it is also 
confirmed the entry of the private sector (mainly financial institutions) to the guarantee funds 
and trusts market. In this sense, our analysis brings to light the existence of two groups of 
guarantee systems: a) a set of nine systems that support the guarantee coverage on their own 
financial equity and b) another group of twenty operators (systems/schemes) that do not support 
the guarantee coverage on their own financial equity but do merely manage autonomous liquid 
resources known as guarantee fund or trust. The latter is largely predominant in the public 
schemes. This categorization is, for all purposes, an absolutely new groundbreaking 
classification for guarantee entities and gives a realistic and practical view of the Latin American 
activity on this subject. It can be observed in Table 8 the various characteristics of these two 
groups based on the different variables analyzed. 
A relevant evidence of this issue is the trend towards the implementation of efficient and 
quality regulatory/supervisory frameworks with regard to the guarantee systems. Thus, in the 
coming years, it will not be probably conceived a guarantee system or scheme without its full 
integration in the corresponding country's financial system, with all its implications. The 
business model consolidation of a guarantee system involves the recognition of its guarantee 
"value" per se; it is definitely achieved through the rating and weighting of its coverage and 
respective rebonding -recognized in the mitigation of its own financial equity and provisions-. 
Undoubtedly this will mark new ways of working and interacting with the financial system as it 
extends and consolidates. 
The guarantee is not a product for SMEs and micro entrepreneurs; it is a product 
designed for financial institutions and must be understood in the traditional scheme of security 
(maximum coverage), profitability (rating and weighting of the collateral), and liquidity (first 
requirement); in brief and as a result, it is tool to facilitate credit to entrepreneurs in the best 
conditions, and from the guarantee coverage provided by the national guarantee system. In the 
mixed guarantee systems, the support of the State can take place through rebonding, granting 
counter guarantees to first-tier guarantee institutions. 
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The implementation and increasing development of the Latin American guarantee 
systems become apparent due to the results of the evolution in the activity, in the number of 
MSMEs assisted, and in the additionality variable -defined as the mobilized credit level for each 
guaranteed unit. A second evidence of this additionality is found in the elevated levels of systems 
that are able to reduce the MSMEs’ financing costs. In our opinion, guarantee systems manage to 
mobilize more credit and improve credit conditions. Our results reveal as well that the secured 
transactions exhibit medium or high terms and the average guaranteed amounts seem reasonable 
for the profile of an entrepreneur. 
On the other hand, the current sustainability is grounded on a philosophy of shared risk 
with the financial sector, reaching for the average coverage rates the 60% of the credit. Financial 
guarantee costs stand at an average of 2.00% for study fee and 2.51% for guarantee fee. The 
prices tend to be differentiated, using some criteria derived from the risk assumed -as the type of 
operation, the terms/periods, or the amount. Regarding the management of incidences, the 
dilemma of sustainability versus additionality is resolved in favor of the former since the 
payment is conditioned -predominating the failed payments (loss)- and seems less attractive to 
the financial entity, while the liability happens to be subsidiary on a covered percentage. These 
situations, with exceptions, are consistent with the study delegation and granting decision for the 
financial entity; in this way, it helps control the lender’s moral hazard but turns the product less 
attractive for the bank. Perhaps the public nature of the resources influences on this moral hazard 
control. The alternative would be a greater involvement in risk control by the system and the 
provision of a much more attractive product to the financial sector, with a more immediate 
payment. The risk control by the system results more effective when business sector takes part 
actively, as is the case of Western Europe. 
In conclusion, the entirely public model has a reason to be present in weak business 
environments since it acts as a triggering mechanism to tackle financial exclusion and improve 
the access conditions; however, as business fabric gets strengthened, the guarantee system can 
get strengthened as well due to its participation; this makes advisable the evolution of the system 
to input private resources that enable higher degrees of additionality for public investment and 
stability for the system -balancing the increasing requirements in relation to the state fiscal 
budgets. Under this scope, the guarantee system moves on to consider that its guarantee product 
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turns really attractive for the credit sector, which reduces its own capital needs and provisions 
with low credit and operational risk. 
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APENDIX 
GUARANTEE SYSTEMS IN PANAMA, DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC, AND MEXICO 
 
 
PANAMA 
Panama has a native initiative of guarantee systems in operation since 2005. This is the 
year in which it is developed the guarantee program for the agricultural and farming activity, 
being its operator the Agricultural Insurance Institute of Panama. 
Before this action, the only scheme known in the Country was the Multilateral Guarantee 
Program for Latin America –FUNDES- (from1985); it was already closed in the early nineties, 
having a low and uneven influence in the region: the FUNDES Guarantee Program
11
 
administrators understood that, as a private institution working with private resources, it should 
not have limited its financial risks and could not have created guarantee programs in each 
country. In its 1994 annual report, it is stated an average loan of U.S. $ 28,318 for the guaranteed 
loans. Specifically, with respect to Panama, it points out 92 borrowers out of a total of 1,781 of 
the program, with a grand total of U.S. $ 2.2 million on U.S. $ 22.3 million of the total portfolio. 
The delinquent loan was U.S. $ 2.4 million (a 6.8% of the portfolio) of which Panama had U.S. $ 
326,000. The losses or failures of the total portfolio in 1994 amounted to 1.1% (a total of U.S. $ 
243,000) of which U.S. $ 23,000 was from Panama. There was also the circumstance that from 
this concrete portfolio it was granted a series of financial operation –without applying 
guarantees- to a direct microcredit program in Panama (1,187 transactions totaling U.S. $ 4.3 
million). 
                                                             
11 Brugger, Reichmuth, and Stocker "Impacto de los programas de garantía de FUNDES sobre pequeñas empresas en América Latina". (1996) y 
Ochring, BID "FUNDES modelo, resultados y perspectivas" (1996). 
41 
By 1988 it was established in Panama
12
 a guarantee fund for U.S. $ 2.0 million under the 
supervision of the National Banking Commission; it losses reached the 5%. It operated with 12 
banks under consensual contracts. The premium was 5% per year and it closed its activity few 
years later. 
In some recent verification efforts it has be identified a germinal intention -on the part of 
the Authorities of the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (AMPYME), specifically in the 
Department of Financial Services- to encourage the creation of a guarantee program for the 
support of MSMEs in the Country. 
 On this new situation for Panama, we believe it would be convenient and appropriate to 
conduct an analysis on the reasons and circumstances that have hindered so far the promotion of 
a guarantee system/scheme of intersectoral nature in Panama. These reasons and circumstances, 
based on experience, could be related to the public sector ineffectiveness to define these 
programs as a potential policy of support to MSMEs in the Country, facilitating the access to 
capital; moreover, business unions have failed conveying this need to the community. 
Experience tells us as well that it is normally the public sector the responsible for leading 
the proposal of policies in this regard, together with the stakeholders. Therefore, the emphasis of 
further research could be based on assumption. The financial sector is usually much more 
passive; it reacts, mobilizes, or takes a stand when a public policy is proposed and oriented in the 
right direction. Anyway, in recent years the circumstances have made the financial sector a much 
more proactive entity; this situation will continue as long as the quality of the risk and the 
guarantees coverage are perceived as a necessity –concerning Basel II and III- and a strategic 
element for the development of the guarantee activity. Among the business unions has been a 
certain concern since the nineties but it does not seem to have experienced further support or 
lobby in that regard. A table with the historical development of the guarantee activity in Panama, 
which in this case reflects a national and current initiative, is outlined below. 
Historical description of the guarantee systems/schemes in Panama 
Year GUARANTEE SYSTEM/SCHEME 
1985 The Guarantee Program for Latin America -FUNDES- (closed) 
1988 Guarantee Fund (closed) 
                                                             
12  Information provided by the USAID 
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2005 The Guarantee Program for Farming Activity – the Agricultural Insurance Institute ISA 
 
 Guarantee entity: The Guarantee Program for Farming Activity 
 
This guarantee program was established by the Law No. 25 of July 19, 2005. In the 
Article 3 is stated that this guarantee program for farming activity will be managed by the 
Institute of Agricultural Insurance ISA and capitalized through an amount, transferred from the 
Agricultural Development Bank to ISA, that reaches the 10,000,000. Millions of Balboas 
(national currency). 
It aims to promote competitiveness in agribusiness sector and to strengthen agricultural 
sector through the access to agricultural financing; it pays special attention to small and medium 
producers in order to improve the national economy performance and raise the living standards 
of rural population in Panama. 
Online reference: http://www.isa.gob.pa/ 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
By 1983, it was created in Dominica Republic an initiative called the Special Credit 
Guarantee Reserve, which was cancelled after a short activity. The same happened to the 
following initiatives: the Shared Guarantee System SIGAC (1996) and the Guarantee Fund for 
the Small Business FOGANPE (2003). 
It is from 2007, through the project "Design of a Guarantees System for the MSME’s 
Sector in Dominican Republic" -with technical assistance provided by international consultants
13
 
within the Program of institutional and policy development framework for the support of the 
micro, small, and medium enterprises (IDB 1474/OC-DR)- when it was possible to achieve, as a 
policy based on a consensus by virtually every involved institution in the Nation, the 
implementation of a reciprocal guarantee system SGR
14
. 
Since 2008 it has been autonomously shaped the last draft for the SGR law in the Central 
Bank of the Dominican Republic. The information gathered indicates that at the end of June 
                                                             
13 Conducted by the international consultant Paul Pombo Gonzalez, according to a methodology developed and experienced in various Latin 
American countries: Venezuela (1997-1999 and 2003-2004), El Salvador (1999-2001 and 2002-2004), Guatemala (2002-2005), Honduras 
(2005 -2007), Dominican Republic (2007), and Mexico (2011). 
14 "Mutual or Reciprocal guarantee societies": these entities are aims at granting guarantee to micro, small, and medium entrepreneurs that act not 
only as beneficiaries but also as part of the society. 
43 
2011 it had been accomplished a substantial progress in the elaboration of the legal document. 
The legislative lobbying was expected to begin by 2012. A table with the historical development 
of the guarantee activity in Dominican Republic is outlined below.  
Historical description of the guarantee systems/schemes in Dominican Republic 
YEAR GUARANTEE SYSTEM/SCHEME 
1983 The Special Credit Guarantee Reserve (closed) 
1996 The Shared Guarantee System SIGAC (closed) 
2003 The Guarantee Fund for Small Business FOGANPE 
2007 The outset for the elaboration of the reciprocal guarantee system (SGR) law 
 
MEXICO 
 
In Mexico the existing guarantee systems are quite recent, but the guarantee mechanism 
for the micro, small, and medium enterprise has a history that dates back to 1932 when certain 
organizations started their activities in this context as mutual entities focused on granting credit 
and oriented to contemplate the possibility of providing guarantees to their partners. After 
several legal reforms, its activity as a mechanism turned to be very focused on the credit activity. 
By 1954, the Development and Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Industry (FOGAIN) -
now extinct- was founded. The FEGA of FIRA was launched in 1972 and later -during the 
eighties- it was followed by the diverse and current guarantee programs, all sponsored by the 
Federal Government through public financial institutions considered development banks. In 
2002, the Secretariat of Economy moved to centralize and bring together the guarantee activity, 
emphasizing how these programs were part of the Federal State policy measures to assist the 
micro, small, and medium enterprise sector. 
In 1989, it was created the guarantees program known as Nacional Financera -NAFIN-
which was restructured under the name of National Guarantee System
15
 in 2002. In this same 
year it was founded SAGARPA as a guarantee entity for the agriculture sector, complementary 
to FIRA and the program for the promotion of exports called GLIEX. A table with the historical 
development of the guarantee activity in Mexico is outlined below. 
Historical description of the guarantee systems/schemes in Mexico  
                                                             
15 Technical assistance provided by the Spanish consultant Pablo Pombo. 
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YEAR GUARANTEE SYSTEM/SCHEME 
1932 Credit Unions 
1954 The Development and Guarantee Fund for the Industrial SME FOGAIN (closed) 
1972 The Agricultural Guarantee Program FEGA del FIRA 
1987 The Guarantee Program for the promotion of exports BANCOMEXT (closed) 
1989 The Guarantee Program Nacional Financiera NAFIN 
1991 The Support Fund for Solidarity Enterprises FONAES 
2002 The Guarantee Program of the Secretariat of Economy 
2003 The guarantee program/scheme known as SAGARPA-FINCAS-FONAGA  
2005 The Liquid Guarantee Program for exports GLIEX-BANCOMEXT 
 
In Mexico the predominance of public guarantee systems is absolute. This model is built 
out of an autonomous liquid resource (a guarantee trust) as a capitalization formula administered 
by a bank or public development agency. Consequently, it handles the guarantee and manages 
the resources without assuming the risk on its own financial equity. The entirely private 
model/scheme is articulated through credit unions that have little effect on this activity at 
present. 
Nowadays, there is in a very advanced process of reflection to integrate the private sector 
along with the different programs. On this basis FOCIR initiated the implementation of a 
reciprocal guarantee system SGR in 2011; with the assistance of international consultants
16
, it 
has achieved during in the first phase of the project the support of virtually all the institutions 
involved. 
Mexico, compared to the rest of Latin America, represents a 24% of current guarantee 
and a 27% of mobilized credit balance, which has been undergoing significant growth rates in 
recent years. This country stands out as well for the number of beneficiaries: 24% of all Latin 
American guarantee clients belong to the Mexican system. It actually ranks fourth in the current 
guarantees index/GDP. Therefore, it is a nation where public policy, concerning these guarantees 
                                                             
16 Conducted by the international consultant Paul Pombo Gonzalez according to a methodology developed and experienced in various Latin 
American countries: Venezuela (1997-1999 and 2003-2004), El Salvador (1999-2001 and 2002-2004), Guatemala (2002-2005), Honduras 
(2005 -2007), Dominican Republic (2007), and Mexico (2011). 
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intended to facilitate access to credit, happens to be determinant and quite relevant for the 
economy of recent years. Within Mexico the FEGA del FIRA, along with SAGARPA -which is 
a complementary guarantee-, account for almost 70% of the guarantees in Mexico and 8% of 
SMEs assisted; with respect to this point, we must clarify that it operates through intermediaries 
called FINCAS and the beneficiary farmers are close to one million.  
Guarantee systems/schemes in Mexico (Table for the activity during 2010)
 
Guarantee systems in Mexico (Table for the activity during 2010 in percentages) 
 
 
Special Fund for Technical Assistance and Agricultural Credit Guarantee (FEGA) of the 
Trusts Instituted in relation to agriculture (FIRA) 
Creation and Legislation 
It was established in 1972 and is one of the four Trusts Instituted in Relation to 
Agriculture (FIRA). The trustee is the Bank of Mexico, while the trustor is the Secretariat of 
Treasury and Public Credit, which is the institution that provides the tax resources. 
System/entity scope. Institutional and Operational Structure 
The financial resources it manages are 100% public, working through financial 
intermediaries and covering credit operations granted by the FIRA or by other financial 
intermediaries that provide services to the target clients of the FIRA. The system is capitalized 
by an autonomous liquid resource managed by a technical committee. The fund's assets are 
invested in banking and government bonds since the fund has to be self-sustainable. 
Each of the four trusts that comprise FIRA has its own technical committee. In the case 
of the Fund committee, the members of the committee appoint the chairman annually, while a 
representative appointed by the Secretariat of Treasury and Public Credit chairs the rest of the 
committees. The president has no executive position at FIRA. The role of the General Director is 
to lead the institution in accordance with the policies, strategies, goals, and provisions adopted 
MEXICO 2010 AÑO ENTES REC. CAP. REC. FG SALDO GAR. PYMES GAR. AÑO PYME AÑO SALDO CTO. CTO. AÑO CORE GV/PIB
FEGA DEL FIRA 1972 1 997.500 2.309.974 25.000 2.900.000 31.500 3.948.538 5.965.960 43,18 0,0022
NAFIN 1997 1 847.662 1.881.281 285.130 2.631.671 251.020 4.118.358 5.641.765 45,06 0,0018
SAGARPA 2003 1 335.286 394.000 0,00 596.000 0,00 0,00 0,00 85,10 0,0003
TOTAL 2010 3 0 2.180.448 4.585.255 310.130 6.127.671 282.520 8.066.896 11.607.725 0,0043
MEXICO 2010 % AÑO ENTES REC. CAP. REC. FG SALDO GAR. PYMES GAR. AÑO PYME AÑO SALDO CTO. CTO. AÑO CORE GV/PIB
FEGA DEL FIRA 1972 1 45,75 50,38 8,06 47,33 11,15 48,95 51,40 43,18 0,0022
NAFIN 1997 1 38,88 41,03 91,94 42,95 88,85 51,05 48,60 45,06 0,0018
SAGARPA 2003 1 15,38 8,59 0,00 9,73 0,00 0,00 0,00 85,10 0,0003
TOTAL 2010 3 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 0,0043
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by the technical committees, and to supervise as well the implementation of these agreements. 
(Article 17 of the Federal Law for the Parastatal Entities). 
The scope of the program is national and sectoral, and its procedures have been certified 
under the ISO-9001quality standards; it has experienced public, external, and internal audits. 
FEGA de FIRA works through commercial banks. Its maximum coverage can reach 90% 
-being the authorization of FEGA’s technical committee required-; although the average 
coverage turns to be 50%, the most common scheme reaches 90%. The coverage includes both 
principal and interest. 
The beneficiaries have to assume a cost of collateral fee (an annual fee on current risk 
balance) ranging between 0.60% and 4%. Depending on the type of operation that the agency 
endorses, there are charges differentiated for the MSMEs -according to criteria established- and 
primarily related to the coverage percentage and the type of collateral guarantee (the so-called 
liquid guarantee). 
The maximum period for those credit operations that finance working capital is 36 
months; for the case of fixed investment, this term escalates to 180 months. The average period 
for the guarantee portfolio is around 23 months, while the average guaranteed amount reaches 
the U.S. $ 77,000. 
The beneficiaries of those guarantees granted by FEGA de FIRA improve their financial 
conditions due to an interest rate cutback, against the regular market conditions that register a 
cost differential between 2% and 3%. 
Basic information of the activity during 2010: see table on page 43 
Online reference: http://www.fira.gob.mx/nd/index.jsp 
 
National Guarantee Fund for the Agriculture, Fisheries, Forestry and Rural sector 
(FONAGA), operated by the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, 
Fisheries, and Food (SAGARPA) 
Establishment and Legislation 
The Fund was created in 2003 as a second level entity to ensure the portfolios of various 
financial intermediaries. SAGARPA defines by itself its priority funding lines. 
System/entity profile. Institutional and operational Structure.  
47 
Its resources are 100% public and it operates through financial intermediaries to which it 
complements their guarantee requirements. The system is financed by autonomous liquid 
resources or funds (FONAGA) administered by SAGARPA; these resources are not integrated 
into the operator's assets. This fund is the means for the system capitalization, so that the 
operator does not assume any risk on its own financial equity. Additionally, the public 
contribution turns explicit when a regulated risk coverage fund is provided. 
The scope of the program has a national, sectoral (agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and 
rural), and temporal nature; its procedures have not been certified by any quality standard and it 
has to go through public audits. 
Its maximum coverage can reach 10%. The coverage includes both principal and interest. 
The primary product it offers to its beneficiaries is the financial collateral intended to: 
Investments in fixed assets and working capital (current assets). The beneficiaries and financial 
intermediaries assume no cost for the guarantee. The maximum period turns to be 36 months 
while the average term reaches the 12 months. The predominant term is between 12 and 36 
months. The maximum guaranteed amount goes up to the U.S. $ 60,902, with an average amount 
of U.S. $. 30,000. 
The beneficiaries of the guarantees granted by SAGARPA improve their financial 
conditions due to an interest rate cutback, against the regular market conditions that register a 
cost differential higher than 3%. 
Basic information of the activity during 2010: see table on page 43 
Online reference: http://www.sagarpa.gob.mx/Paginas/default.aspx 
 
Guarantee entity: The Nacional Financiera Guarantee Program S.N.C. (NAFIN) 
Establishment and Legislation 
Nacional Financiera -S.N.C. (National Credit Society)- is the development bank of 
Mexico and operates according to its own organic law: the Law for Credit Institutions and 
general provisions issued by the National Banking Commission and Securities. The guarantee 
system began operating in 1997, although the company was established in 1934. The strategic 
objective of the Nacional Financiera guarantee program (SNC) is to facilitate access to credit for 
micro, small, and medium enterprises in the industry, trade, and service sectors, both to finance 
fixed assets or current. 
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System/entity Profile. Institutional and Operational Structure 
NAFIN manages two trusts that form the National Guarantee System. One of them is 
supported by its own resources and the other acts as administrator of the Secretariat of Economy; 
its main mission is to rebond the operations of the other trust. The Secretariat of Economy 
provides the funding for a second trust that is managed by the National Financiera since 2005 
and complements the trust funded by the NAFIN’s resources, which create effects similar to 
those generated by the rebonding. The maximum rebonding coverage reaches 33%, being the 
average coverage 20%. NAFIN controls almost 95% of the resources that the Secretariat of 
Economy allocates for this purpose. 
The guarantee program NAFIN is a national and sectoral project; its procedures have 
been certified under the ISO-9000 quality standards. It regularly goes through to external, public, 
and internal audits. 
The Nacional Financiera guarantee program (S.N.C.) accomplishes relevantly its 
guarantee activity, even when, as a development bank, it is engaged in other financing activities 
for the MSME. The maximum coverage for investment assets goes to 70%, while the average 
reaches 50%; in particular and exceptional circumstances (e.g. natural disasters) it can go up to 
100%. The coverage includes both principal and interest. 
The primary product it offers to its beneficiaries is the financial collateral; it marginally 
provides financial advice. The financial guarantees are granted to cover: investments in fixed 
assets, working capital (current assets), lease transactions, and additionally operations that 
facilitate access to public acquisitions programs. The beneficiaries have to assume a maximum 
guarantee fee of 3%, which is annual on current risk balance. The maximum period of operations 
is in 240 months, while the average term is 40 months. Regarding the quantities, the maximum 
guaranteed amount per company/operation is U.S. $ 1,250,000, with an average amount of U.S. 
$ 32,000. 
The beneficiaries of the guarantees provided by NAFIN (S.N.C.) improve their financial 
conditions due to an interest rate cutback, against the regular market conditions that register a 
cost differential higher than 3%. 
 
Basic information of the activity during 2010: see table on page 43 
Online reference: http://www.nafin.com/portalnf/content/home/home.html 
